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Festure
American Cop Magazine sponsored the Law Enforcement Education Program at the 2024 SHOT Show, which gave Editor Erick Gelhaus the opportunity to present an informative program entitled “Ready Positions and Better Outcomes ” to officers from a wide variety of domestic and international agencies.
Your editor introducing himself.
Gelhaus’ presentation explored the root causes of “mistake of fact” shootings by analyzing related research conducted by the military, law enforcement, and academic communities. His review of four different scientific studies provided useful insights about how and why these mistakes happen and what officers and trainers can do to help mitigate them.
Agency Data
Prior to reviewing the literature, Gelhaus cited real-world examples of agency statistics that illustrated the frequency of mistake-of-fact shootings. For example, in 2012, the Los Angeles County (CA) Sheriff’s Department estimated their deputies accidentally mistook ordinary objects (like cell phones) for deadly weapons in five to fifteen shootings per year. Similarly, in 2018, the neighboring Los Angeles Police Department estimated that 14% of the 211 officer-involved shootings that occurred between 2013 and 2017 were “perception-only shootings,” in which unarmed suspects were mistakenly identified as being armed.
The presentation covered these studies from Taylor, Aveni, Biggs et al, and ALERRT.
While we understand these shootings are shaped and influenced by factors such as dispatch priming, low light, ambiguity, rapidly changing circumstances, and the debilitating effects of stress-induced physiological, emotional, and cognitive changes, we are morally obligated to find ways to combat these mistakes and decrease their frequency.
Taylor’s Work
The specific ready positions used in Taylor’s research.
To that end, Gelhaus debriefed a study conducted by Paul L. Taylor of the University of Colorado Denver School of Public Affairs, in which an officer’s ready posture while confronting a potentially armed suspect was evaluated to determine if it influenced decision-making.
What can you really see with your ready positions?
Taylor’s research involved a group of 313 officers who participated in scenarios where a suspect pulled either a handgun or a cell phone out of their pocket and found that officers who began the encounter in a shooting position, with their weapon in their eyeline and aimed at the suspect, made more than double the number of mistakes as officers who stood with their handgun’s muzzle at the belt line, in a “low ready” position. While holding their weapon at low ready added a negligible 11/100th of a second (0.11 seconds) to the time it took to fire a shot in the gun scenario (compared to looking at the suspect through the sights), this was more than offset by a 100%-plus reduction in mistake of fact shootings in the cell phone scenario (a drop from 64% to 30%).
Aveni’s Study
In another study conducted by Thomas Aveni of the Police Policy Studies Council, 38% of unarmed, role-playing suspects were mistakenly shot, with 92% of them in a “surrender” position at the time of shooting. Aveni’s analysis indicated that the officer’s and suspect’s race were not a factor in these decisions—instead, the suspect’s behavior (and particularly the speed at which he moved) was the most critical element in whether or not police mistakenly shot an unarmed person. Even minor factors such as the suspect’s clothing or age were determined to be more important than the racial identities of the officer and suspect.
Every suspect in Aveni’s study turned on the officers.
Of note, the officers who made the fewest mistakes in the study came from agencies with the most robust scenario-based training (a 24% error rate, compared to a 40%- plus error rate by officers from agencies who did not conduct scenario-based training), leading Aveni to conclude that such training improves an officer’s ability to make proper use of force decisions in rapidly unfolding confrontations.
Research from DoD
In a study conducted by Adam Biggs of the US Navy’s Special Warfare Command, the effects of stress on perception were studied. In part, Dr. Biggs’ research indicated that more highly skilled shooters made better use of force decisions under stress. Perhaps this is because they could commit more cognitive resources to evaluating the threat and choosing an appropriate response—they had more “brain space“ for decision-making because their shooting skills were perfected to a degree they could be performed at a subconscious level. Additionally, these more competent shooters were probably experiencing lower levels of stress and arousal, which allowed them the ability to think more clearly.
Decision-making improved after re-training on judgment and decision-making.
Additionally, Biggs’ research, like Aveni’s, indicated that scenario-based force-on-force (FoF) training could decrease negative outcomes. Biggs’ data indicated that 7 out of 24 participants (29%) fired at an unarmed suspect prior to conducting a FoF training exercise. In contrast, none of them (0%) fired at an unarmed suspect in similar test circumstances after the training.
Cumulative Impact
These were the recommendations from Aveni’s work – better scenario training, restrictive policies don’t work, avoid higher ready positions.
These studies, and others discussed by Gelhaus, indicate that improvements in police training, tactics, and policies can have a positive effect on reducing mistake of fact shootings. Tactics that encourage the use of low-ready muzzle positions may help to increase visibility, deliver better information, and increase the amount of time available for decision-making before the shot, thereby improving the use-of-force decisions. Similarly, rigorous training, particularly scenario-based FoF training that increases an officer’s skill and confidence, may help to improve the use of force decision-making as well.
Final Thoughts
The specific areas that Biggs’s second recommended focusing on.
There are many aspects of officer-involved shootings that we have no control over, but we do have the ability to impact officer training, tactics, and competency. As Gelhaus’ presentation demonstrated, the available research indicates that this is a worthy endeavor for police trainers and leaders if we want to decrease mistake-of-fact shootings.
God bless you all, and be safe out there!
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About the Author: Mike Wood is a law enforcement trainer and an instructor with National Training Concepts. He’s the author of Newhall Shooting: A Tactical Analysis, the acclaimed study of the 1970 gunfight that shaped police training, equipment, and culture for generations. Mike also serves as the Senior Editor at RevolverGuy.com.
